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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF DISCLOSING HMO
PHYSICIAN INCENTIVES
MARK A. HALL*
I
INTRODUCTION
Law professors, as a whole, are rather worldly and cynical about financial,
political, and other suspect forms of motivation.  I was therefore surprised to
find that, as managed care was taking hold in the early 1990s, several of my
colleagues were genuinely startled to learn that Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (“HMOs”) commonly reward physicians for saving costs, which often
entails withholding care.  My colleagues first learned of this when my university
required all of its employees to switch from Blue Cross insurance to its own
newly established HMO, created to keep the University’s physicians and affili-
ated hospital from losing business.  As the resident expert on managed care, I
was peppered for several months with anxious questions and angry comments
about this change.  The reaction that most surprised me was the dismay over
learning that our HMO, like most others, uses a risk pool to reward its physi-
cians for staying within budget.  My colleagues wanted to know how long
HMOs had been doing this and why they had not heard about it before.
In a recent commentary, health economist James Robinson observed that
“the fundamental flaw of managed care, in retrospect, was that it sought to
navigate the tensions between limited resources and unlimited expectations
without explaining exactly how it was so doing.”1  As my experience reflects,
this is certainly true for HMOs’ use of physician incentives, one of managed
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1. James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2623 (2001).  More
acerbically, George Anders has commented that “HMOs don’t present themselves as the medical
equivalent of a tawdry motel chain or a discount clothing store in a rundown part of town, blithely
selling an inferior product in the name of having the cheapest possible price.  Managed-care companies
promise to uphold standards through their cost cutting, simply by targeting wasteful practices.”
GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST
59 (1996).
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care’s major tools.  HMOs routinely pay physicians in a manner that rewards
them for saving costs,2 in sharp contrast with the inflationary incentives of tradi-
tional fee-for-service reimbursement.  Other features of managed care are visi-
ble to all members, such as a limited network of providers, primary care gate-
keeping, or prior authorization requirements.  Physician incentives, however,
are entirely behind the scenes.
Elsewhere in this symposium, HMOs are faulted for failing to justify their
overall cost-containment mission or their more visible cost-containment tech-
niques.  But at least these aspects of managed care are generally known to con-
sumers.  Regarding financial incentives, most HMOs until recently have made
no effort even to call these to people’s attention, much less justify their use.
Disclosure of financial incentives to consumers has occurred only in the past
three years, in response to several legal pressures.  The nondisclosure of incen-
tives is a major focus in the legal attack against the HMO industry mounted by
the class action lawsuits discussed elsewhere in this volume.3  The presence of
undisclosed financial incentives is also being used by plaintiffs’ lawyers in more
garden-variety tort suits to help establish breach of a duty of care or to make a
case for punitive damages.4  And patient protection legislation adopted recently
in many states, and proposed in Congress, requires HMOs to disclose their phy-
sician payment methods.5
These developments call for an assessment of the theory and practice of dis-
closing physician incentives.  To what extent does the earlier silence of HMOs
about physician incentives account for the public’s backlash against managed
care and the failure to appreciate the need for making cost/benefit trade-offs in
medicine?  Now that disclosure is becoming more commonplace, will this
increase the public’s acceptance of HMOs, or will it further undermine trust?
Will anyone even notice?  To gain better understanding of these issues, this arti-
cle begins by summarizing the theoretical case for mandating disclosure of
2. Payment typically occurs in two basic forms.  Capitation payments pay physicians a fixed
amount for each patient for whom they are responsible, regardless of the costs of care.  Capitation
comes in various forms depending on what portion of services it covers (for example, primary care,
specialist referrals, or hospitalization).  Alternatively, HMOs can create a “withhold pool” or “risk
pool” that makes a portion of a physician’s payment contingent on whether the physician meets
budgetary goals.  See generally T.S. Bodenheimer and K. Grumbach, Capitation or Decapitation:
Keeping your Head in Changing Times, 276 JAMA 1025 (1996); Marsha Gold et al., Behind the Curve:
A Critical Assessment of How Little is Known About Arrangements Between Managed Care Plans and
Physicians, 52 MED. CARE RES. REV. 307 (1995); H.T. Greely, Direct Financial Incentives in Managed
Care: Unanswered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53 (1996); D. Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to
Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155 (1996); Steven D. Pearson et al.,
Ethical Guidelines for Physician Compensation Based on Capitation, 339 N. ENGL. J. MED. 689 (1998).
3. See Gail R. Agrawal & Howard R. Veit, Back to the Future: The Managed Care Revolution, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (Autumn 2002); Clark C. Havinghurst, How the Health Care Revolution
Fell Short, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (Autumn 2002).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 31-32.
5. For an overview of state law, see Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician
Financial Incentives, 281 JAMA 1424-30 (1999).  The current federal bills require disclosure only upon
request, as under Medicare.  S. 1052, 107th Cong. § 121(c)(2) (2001); H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. § 121(c)(2)
(2001).
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incentives, in terms of various types of information market failures.  The article
then analyzes the components of liability and regulatory law that require disclo-
sure, observing how well each source of law responds to different aspects of the
justification for disclosure.  Following this, empirical literature is explored on
the content, source, and timing of disclosures now being made, and on the
impact of incentive disclosures.  The article concludes by sketching a model
approach to disclosure, one that provides information in layers, at different
points, and in varying levels of detail, as best suits people’s desire and need for
information.
II
THE CASE FOR MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
A. Reasons for Incentive Disclosure
In his comprehensive analysis of the disclosure of health-related informa-
tion, William Sage presents three separate rationales for disclosing physician
incentives: promoting competition, reducing agency problems, and enhancing
social awareness.6  Disclosing physician incentives promotes competition by
heightening focus on whether HMOs are using appropriate incentives and by
stimulating innovation in new types of incentives.  For example, the market has
evolved in the past few years away from incentives addressed exclusively to
cost-saving and more toward mixed incentives that reward both cost-saving and
improved performance.  Blue Cross/Blue Shield of California recently
announced with much fanfare that it is dropping cost-containment incentives
altogether in favor of incentives that reward higher patient satisfaction and
greater use of preventive health services.7  PacifiCare also announced that it
would reward physicians for holding down patients’ out-of-pocket costs (for co-
payments and prescription drugs, for instance) rather than holding down total
medical costs.8  These policy shifts appear to be stimulated by increased public
awareness of incentives and competitors’ desires to formulate more appealing
types of incentives.
Incentive disclosure also reduces agency problems by addressing the conflict
of interest that can arise when physicians are rewarded for reducing costs.9
Short of banning such incentives, disclosure puts patients on notice that their
physicians may be influenced by payment methods, which allows patients to
6. William Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999) [hereinafter Sage, Regulating Through Information].
7. Blue Cross of California to Base Physician Incentives on Quality of Care, 10 HEALTH L. REP.
(BNA) 1104, 1104 (2001).
8. Cheryl Jackson, HMO Ties Bonuses to Saving Patients Money, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001,
at 20; see also Jennifer Powell, HMO Deal May Create Precedent: Harvard Pilgrim’s Pact with Partners
Links $$, Quality-of-Care Goals, BOSTON HERALD, June 20, 2001, at 31 (reporting an HMO’s
agreement to reward a hospital network for improving its quality of care).
9. See Mark A. Hall, Motivating Physicians Through Financial Incentives: An Agency Theory
Perspective, in PHYSICIAN CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 228 (R. Spece et al. eds., 1997).
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better look after their own interests when evaluating a physician’s treatment
recommendations.  Also, if disclosure occurs at the right time and with suffi-
cient options, it can present the opportunity either to consent to or to refuse
such incentives, which gives these ethically troubling incentives greater legiti-
macy.10  Furthermore, disclosure has a cautionary impact on physicians by deter-
ring them from agreeing to accept payment methods that they would not be
comfortable acknowledging and discussing with their patients.11
Most relevant to this symposium, disclosure of incentives serves the more
public purpose of educating health care consumers about the need to constrain
health care spending and the trade-offs among competing methods for doing so.
Incentive disclosure is an opportunity to explain the inflationary incentives of
traditional fee-for-service reimbursement, the potential harms of overtreat-
ment, and the common stake that everyone has in keeping health insurance
affordable.  Disclosure can also be done in a fashion that compares different
types of cost-control mechanisms, by observing that using physician incentives
may be preferable to forcing patients to pay for more of their medical costs out
of pocket or to setting inflexible, across-the-board limits on what insurance will
cover.12  Although these points are fundamental to health care policy and to
how health insurance is currently financed, they are not widely appreciated
because our understanding and expectations of health insurance were formed
during the era of unconstrained indemnity insurance.
B. Making Disclosure Mandatory
Having good reasons for disclosure, however, is not sufficient justification to
legally mandate it.  Economic theory predicts that properly functioning markets
will produce roughly the types of information that consumers need in order to
make adequately informed purchasing decisions.13  Imperfections in the market
production of consumer information certainly can be expected, and the relative
costs and benefits of perfecting product information can be debated.  If a cate-
gory of information is entirely absent, however, one must ask, before mandating
its disclosure, whether the information is important and why the market has
failed to produce it.  If knowledge about physician payment methods is in fact
an important piece of consumer information, one would expect consumers to
inquire, or insurers to advertise, about this component of managed care.  This is
true even if the relevant information is negative, since firms that do better are
10. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 193-224 (1997) [hereinafter HALL, MEDICAL SPENDING
DECISIONS].
11. See Mark A. Hall, Managed Care Medical Ethics: A Dose of Realism, 128 ANN. INTERN. MED.
395, 398 (1998) [hereinafter Hall, A Dose of Realism]; Sage, Regulation Through Information, supra
note 6, at 1770.
12. See generally HALL, MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS, supra note 10.  For an example of this
type of disclosure see also Appendix B.
13. Wesley Magat, Information Regulation, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 302, 302 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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well-motivated to tout their superiority.14  At least by inference, consumers will
assume that firms that are silent on a potentially negative point have something
to hide, which tends to force all but the most negative firms to reveal their
attributes regarding the pertinent issue.
Mandating disclosure unnecessarily, either when it would occur naturally or
when the information is not actually relevant to consumers’ decisions, could
impose several costs beyond the trivial costs of releasing the information.  Clut-
tering consumer information with irrelevant and distracting detail makes it
more difficult to focus on the information consumers find truly important,
which detracts from the ultimate economic goal of disclosure.  Also, because
governmental mandates tend to be uniform and difficult to modify, they may
lock into place a form or content of disclosure that is suboptimal.  A govern-
ment mandate runs the risk of delivering the wrong type or quantity of informa-
tion, in the wrong format, and at the wrong time.  Therefore, further reflection
is needed to establish more firmly the justification for mandatory disclosure
laws.
Three types of market failure potentially justify mandating disclosure of
physician incentives.15  Each of these market failures affects other aspects of
managed care; therefore, this explanation goes a long way toward advancing
understanding of why HMOs have failed to achieve their potential in the other
arenas explored in this symposium.16  The first and most fundamental form of
market failure exists in the disjunction between who pays for health insurance
and who consumes it.  The market forces that shape disclosure practices are
driven primarily by employers, because they are the ultimate purchasing deci-
sion-makers that health insurers need to woo.17  Physician incentives are much
less relevant to employers’ decisions, however, or are relevant in different ways,
than they are to the ultimate consumers of health care because the agency
problems created by physician conflicts of interest affect patients, not purchas-
ers.  Purchasers tend to be concerned with how well cost-containment methods
work, but not especially concerned about the particular methods.18  Therefore, a
competitive market driven by employer purchasing decisions is not likely to
produce the types of information that patients desire.  This point holds not only
for physician incentives, but also for many other types of information about
health insurance.  This market distortion is caused by the tax and regulatory
14. Michael Fishman & Kathleen Hagerty, Mandatory Disclosure, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 605, 605 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 751-53 (1984).
16. See Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation
of Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2002).
17. David A. Hyman & Mark A. Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 27-28 (2002).
18. See Gail Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical Marketplace, 66
U. MO. L. REV. 341, 370-71 (2001).
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policies that favor employer-based insurance,19 but, for other reasons, it does
not make sense to abandon or radically alter this system.20  Therefore, the
second-best option is to mandate disclosure of the types of information that a
purer market would likely generate.21
Second, an application of what is known as the “lemons” phenomenon
undermines the ability of even a fully competitive market from generating
important consumer information.  The “lemons” phenomenon, which is gener-
alized from the automobile market, holds whenever product information is
difficult to verify independently.22  In these circumstances, competitive markets
tend to suppress rather than generate the information because it is difficult for
producers to convince consumers that they provide better value at a higher
price.23  Without the ability to compare, consumers assume the worst about all
producers, and therefore are willing to pay only for lower quality goods or
services.  The market-clearing price, or equilibrium, settles at a suboptimal level
that will not support higher quality, even when some or many purchasers would
be willing to pay for more.  In the present context, a version of this type of
market failure exists because of the difficulty in determining physician payment
methods without disclosure.  Payment methods cannot be directly observed, in
contrast with other cost-containment tools.  Many HMOs regard them as trade
secrets, and physicians can be prohibited by contract from revealing them.
Insurers willing to reveal that they use superior forms of incentives therefore
have a difficult time convincing consumers that this is true, since comparative
information is difficult to ferret out without mandatory disclosure.
Finally, incentive disclosure suffers from a classic public goods or collective
action problem.  When many of the costs or benefits of a product extend far
beyond the parties to an immediate transaction, the good will be produced at
suboptimal levels, because the incentives affecting individual producers or con-
sumers are poorly matched to broader social welfare.  Public education is a clas-
sic example.  Education here takes the form of raising general public awareness
of the need to contain health care costs and the merits and drawbacks of com-
peting approaches.  Willingness to pay for this information is a public goods
problem, although perhaps a trivial one.  More significantly, insurers’ willing-
ness to bear the reputational costs of supplying this information is a collective
action problem.  The industry as a whole may realize that there is a collective
advantage to lowering public expectations about the ability of insurance to fund
health care as if costs were never a legitimate consideration.  No single insurer,
19. See generally MARK PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT WORK: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE (1997).
20. Hyman & Hall, supra note 17, at 30-41.
21. For a similar argument relating to mandatory disclosure in the securities market, see Paul
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048-52
(1995).
22. George A. Akerloff, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); see also Cal. Dental Assoc. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-72 (1991) (discussing
information problems that affect health care markets).
23. Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1997-98 (2001).
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however, would view it as an advantage to its competitive stance to be the first
to break the bad news.  Collectively, insurers appear willing to be more candid
about the less appealing aspects of their cost containment objectives, so long as
there is some assurance that all insurers will do so.  Absent compulsion, how-
ever, this assurance simply is not available.  Instead, pack mentality leads insur-
ers to stress only the positive aspects of managed care.  This distortion is built
into the very name the industry has embraced for its product: the positive-
sounding term “health maintenance.”  Individual HMOs employ similarly
happy monikers for their company names.24
This dissection of market imperfections is more than just an academic exer-
cise to justify the legal and policy decision to mandate disclosure.  Each type of
market failure is distinct, each aligns with one of the three economic and social
purposes of incentive disclosure outlined above, and each type points to differ-
ent ways in which disclosure should be mandated.  The “lemons” imperfection
relates most strongly to the simple competitive function of disclosure—one that
informs in order to spark the competitive forces that shape development of
superior physician incentives.  One simple solution to the “lemons” imperfec-
tion is to remove the obstacles to verifying incentives in use.  This might consist
of banning so-called “gag clauses,” which is now universally the law;25 requiring
that physician incentives be reported to government regulators as is required
for Medicare HMOs;26 and declaring that the general structure of physician
payment methods is not a legitimate trade secret.  These measures should be
sufficient to allow incentive information to come forward in the form and to the
extent that it is relevant to market transactions.
The market imperfection created by employers’ purchase of health insur-
ance, however, requires further measures to address the purpose of promoting
an effective agency relationship.  Insurers might be required actively to inform
consumers of their physician payment methods prior to choosing insurance, or
physicians might be required to reveal financial conflicts of interest at the point
at which patients are evaluating physicians’ treatment recommendations.  If,
however, disclosure is motivated by ethical concerns over how incentives might
affect physician judgment, requiring physicians to disclose incentives at the
point of treatment might be exactly the wrong method, since this forces physi-
cians to call to mind the very conflicting incentive that we would like physicians
to ignore.27  Instead, disclosure might better occur when patients first sign up
with a physician and periodically thereafter, regardless of any pending treat-
ment decisions.  Such disclosures might not require great detail about the tech-
24. For instance, Wake Forest University’s home-grown HMO is named “QualChoice.”  Similarly,
the HMO created by Duke University was named “Wellpoint.”
25. Joan H. Krause, The Brief Life of the Gag Clause: Why Anti-Gag Clause Legislation Isn’t
Enough, 67 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1999).
26. Physician Incentive Payments, 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(h)(3), § 434.70.
27. See Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 526 (1997)
[hereinafter Hall, Economic Informed Consent].
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nical aspects of payment methods.  As discussed more fully below,28 it could be
sufficient, under some rationales, simply to describe the existence and general
orientation of physician incentives, rather than to insist on disclosures that
amount to warnings, 29 as occurs for potential product defects or under informed
consent law.
The educative purpose, which suffers most directly from the collective
action or public goods imperfection, points to a very different type of disclo-
sure.  This purpose could be advanced by disclosing incentives after purchasing
insurance, and apart from any discrete decision about treatment or insurance
selection.  The content of disclosure would be oriented more toward explaining
or justifying incentives, rather than simply describing them or issuing warnings.
In sum, the different theoretical purposes for disclosing financial incentives
point toward disclosures of distinctly different content, sources, and timing.  To
learn which of these theories and practices are the prevailing ones, we next
examine the sources of law that currently require disclosure.  This discussion
will be followed by a description and analysis of how HMOs currently disclose
physician incentives and a review of empirical evidence about the effects of
these disclosures.
III
LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR MANDATING DISCLOSURE
A. Liability for Nondisclosure
Disclosure can be mandated through two basic legal mechanisms: liability
and regulation.30  A variety of tort law theories is being used to impose liability
on HMOs for failing to disclose incentives.  In medical malpractice cases, plain-
tiffs’ lawyers are seeking to hold HMOs responsible for physicians’ negligence
by arguing that a physician’s departure from the standard of care was caused by
an HMO’s undisclosed incentive plan,31 and that undisclosed incentives are
grounds for imposing punitive damages.32  Legal theorists have argued that fail-
28. See infra text accompanying notes 85-91.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 92-99.
30. Disclosure of financial conflicts of interest is also required by medical and institutional ethics
authorities.  See L. McCullough, A Basic Concept in the Clinical Ethics of Managed Care: Physicians
and Institutions as Economically Disciplined Moral Co-Fiduciaries of Populations of Patients, 24 J.
MED. & PHILO. 77 (1999).
31. See infra note 54.
32. The most notorious example is Fox v. Health Net, in which a California jury awarded $77
million in punitive damages in a breach of contract action against an HMO that had refused to pay for
an innovative cancer treatment, which the surviving family claimed resulted in the patient’s death.  The
verdict was reportedly affected by the fact that the HMO’s medical director was paid in a fashion that
rewarded him in proportion to the number of claims he turned down.  No. 219624, 1993 WL 794305
(Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1993).  See Allison Walsh, The Legal Attack on Cost Containment Mechanisms,
31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 232 (1997).
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ure to disclose incentives can form the basis of informed consent liability,33
although so far this particular argument has not succeeded in the courtroom.34
The failure to disclose incentives is at the heart of the class action suits pending
against each of the major HMOs.35  Nondisclosure is claimed to be a species of
fraud giving rise to a RICO violation, and it is claimed to be a breach of fiduci-
ary duty under ERISA.  The ERISA fiduciary claim was given more promi-
nence by a passing reference in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pegram v. Her-
drich.36  Similar fraud and fiduciary claims have also been made under state
common law.37
Depending on the particular legal theory used and the consequences of
finding a violation, the threat of liability might result in widely different disclo-
sure formats that vary in source, content, and timing.  A tort law theory is likely
to focus on whether the disclosure was made in the context of a treatment deci-
sion, rather than in the context of choosing or enrolling in a health plan, since
the relevant issue is how the disclosure allegedly relates to a bad medical out-
come.  A fraud theory is likely to focus on disclosure by the health plan, rather
than by the physician, because the health plan is the source of the incentive, and
it is the insurance product that is arguably devalued by the existence of the
incentive.  To avoid a fraud accusation, the disclosure ostensibly should occur
prior to or at the time of insurance purchase.  A fiduciary theory presents a
hybrid case.  It might be relevant either to insurance purchase or to medical
treatment, and to both a physician and a health plan.  Fiduciary obligations
could be satisfied at points in time other than the immediate context of deciding
about treatment or insurance purchase.  For instance, disclosure might occur
following enrollment in the health plan, or at the point at which a patient first
selects a primary care physician, since the information relates to a patient’s
overall and ongoing relationship with the plan and the provider.  Thus, liability
theories send inconsistent messages about who should be making incentive dis-
closures and when they should occur.
33. Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost
Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 264 (1999); Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Systemic Theory of Informed
Consent in Managed Care, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1631, 1632 (1999).
34. See Hall, Economic Informed Consent, supra note 27, at 582-83; Krause, supra note 33, at 376.
35. See, e.g., Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Managed Care Litig., No. 00-
1334-MD-MORENO, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14501, at *1. (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2001).
36. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000) (holding that the existence of physician
incentives does not state a claim for breach of ERISA fiduciary duties, but noting that the plaintiff had
failed to preserve a claim for failing to disclose such incentives, which might constitute a fiduciary
breach). This ERISA theory was accepted in Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625,626 (8th Cir. 1997), but
rejected in Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 198 F.3d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 2000).  See generally
Richard D. Leigh, Physician Incentives and ERISA Fiduciary Liability after Pegram v. Herdrich: What
Solutions are Available to HMO Patients Harmed by Non-disclosure of Incentive Compensation
Schemes?, 106 DICK. L. REV. 415 (2002).
37. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 208 F.3d 712, 716-17 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating in dictum that a
fiduciary claim is available under Minnesota law); Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ill. 2000)
(rejecting a fiduciary claim).  See generally Peter D. Jacobson & Michael T. Cahill, Applying Fiduciary
Responsibilties in the Managed Care Context, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 155 (2000).
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The content of incentive disclosure also varies widely depending on the par-
ticular theory of liability.  Under most liability theories, it should be sufficient
simply to provide bare notice of financial incentives in terms that describe their
general structure and direction.  This is all that is required in other fiduciary
contexts such as legal representation and financial dealings.38  Elsewhere, there
is no precedent for requiring a full articulation of all components of compensa-
tion systems and their possible effects.39  For instance, it is generally considered
sufficient for legal representation that the client know simply whether a lawyer
is paid by the hour or on a contingency fee basis, and the relevant rates.  Like-
wise, for a real estate agent or a financial advisor, typically all that one is told, if
anything, is that they are paid a commission of a certain size.  It is obvious in
what direction these incentives point.  Statistics and examples of how events
might go badly could increase understanding, but they are not required, nor are
they routinely given.  Similarly, in medicine, under most liability theories it
should be sufficient to be told that, in contrast with fee-for-service incentives, a
physician is paid in a way that encourages savings costs.
Much more extensive disclosure might be required, however, under an
extension of informed consent theory, which has its roots in fiduciary principles.
Under informed consent law as it has developed in many states, it can be argued
that all factors that are relevant to a treatment decision must be disclosed in as
much detail as a reasonable patient might desire to fully inform her evaluation
of a physician’s treatment recommendation.40  The higher level of disclosure and
understanding might also be required if disclosure were being used not simply
to avoid liability for failure to disclose but instead as an affirmative defense in a
negligence case asserting that a patient had agreed to accept a lower standard of
care.  The extent to which providers disclose the medical risks of treatment
illustrate how extensive the resulting financial disclosures might be, if prompted
by the threat of informed consent liability.  Although informed consent law has
not yet been applied in this fashion to cost-containment financial incentives,41
several commentators argue that it should be.42  To be completely safe from
legal challenge, incentive disclosures might need to include not only detailed
38. See Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real Estate
Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents’ Rewards, 36 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1993).
39. Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 777-80 (1994); L.S.
Sealy, Some Principles of Fiduciary Obligations, CAMBRIDGE L. J. 119 (1963).
40. This is the so-called “patient-centered” standard, which stands in contrast to the less
demanding professional standard of disclosure.  States are equally split in their adoption of these two
standards.  See Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General Measure of Duty
to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R. 3d 1008 (1978); William M. McNichols,
Informed Consent Liability in a “Material Information” Jurisdiction: What does the Future Portend?, 48
OKLA. L. REV. 711, 716 (1995).
41. Hall, Economic Informed Consent, supra note 27; Krause, supra note 33.
42. See Krause, supra note 33, at 262; Devon McGraw, Note, Financial Incentives to Limit Services:
Should Physicians be Required to Disclose these to Patients?, 83 GEO. L. J. 1821-47 (1995); E. Haavi
Morreim, Diverse and Perverse Incentives of Managed Care: Bringing Patients into Alignment, 1 WID. L.
SYMP. J. 89, 120 (1996); Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ.
L. REV. 313 (2002); Susan Wolf, supra note 33, at 1631-81.
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descriptions of the nature and content of payment methods, but also warnings
about the possible harms that might occur, and measures that patients can take
to protect themselves.43  Moreover, to achieve full informed consent, patients
would need to be warned about the contrasting harms of fee-for-service pay-
ment (which are much better documented)44 and informed about the health-
promoting advantages of cost-containment incentives.
There is good reason to question a physician’s ability to practice medicine
under such unrealistic circumstances.45  As the California Supreme Court
observed in Arato v. Avedon,
[t]he [clinical contexts] in which physicians and patients interact and
exchange information . . . are so multifarious, the information needs
and degree of dependency of individual patients so various, and the
professional relationship itself such an intimate and irreducibly judg-
ment-laden one, that we believe it is unwise to require as a matter of
law that a particular species of information be disclosed.46
43. See generally Comment, Informed Consent: From Disclosure to Patient Participation in Medical
Decisionmaking, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 172, 192-95 (1981) (advocating an exhaustive three-page, fourteen-
point list of guidelines that require physicians to describe the recommended procedure in detail; why
the patient’s condition might necessitate it; all material risks; the factors used to determine which risks
are material; the potential benefits of the procedure; the efficacy of the treatment in achieving those
benefits; the risks and benefits of alternative treatments; and why the physician thinks one course is
preferable to others.  Other suggestions include that the doctor should make special efforts to
encourage patient inquiries or have information repeated; he should frequently ask whether the patient
understands; and he should inform the patient of his rights to disagree, to choose any alternative, and to
change his mind at any time); see also Marc A. Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest: The
Limitations of Disclosure, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1405-06 (1989) (claiming that effective
disclosures of incentives must have warnings about possible harms); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary
Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L.
REV. 365, 377 (1990).
For instance, the following example, taken from S.D. Goold and H. Brody, would not appear to
meet the most demanding versions of informed consent law:
A physician, talking with a patient with typical migraines, might say, “Your headaches are
typical for migraines.  In about one of 1,000 cases these types of headaches are due to other
abnormalities, which we could find on a CT scan or MRI of the head.  There is also a good
chance (about one out of three) that an ‘abnormality’ on a scan would not really be there, and
this could cause worry and possibly unnecessary further tests.  I don’t generally recommend
scans for migraines because of this risk of error and because they are expensive.
Rationing Decisions in Managed Care Settings: An Ethical Analysis, in HEALTH CARE CRISIS?  THE
SEARCH FOR ANSWERS 141 (R.I. Misbin et al. eds., 1995).
In comparison, a California court upheld a large plaintiff’s verdict for failing to urge a patient
forcefully enough to obtain a biopsy on a tiny mole, holding that it was not sufficient for the doctor, a
general practitioner, to “strongly recommend [seeing] a specialist” and to warn him that “all pigmented
skin lesions are suspicious in nature” until removed and studied microscopically.  The court reasoned
that the doctor should have specifically mentioned the risk of cancer and its consequences.  Moore v.
Preventive Medicine Medical Group, 223 Cal. Rptr. 859, 861, 863-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
44. See generally CHARLES B. INLANDER ET AL., MEDICINE ON TRIAL (1988); INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY SCIENCES, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM (1999); Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized
Patients, 279 JAMA 1200-1205 (1998); Lucian Leape, Unnecessary Surgery, 13 ANN. REV. PUB.
HEALTH 363 (1992); Barbara Starfield, Is U.S. Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 JAMA 483
(2000).
45. HALL, MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS, supra note 10, at 204-09; Sage, Regulating Through
Information, supra note 6, at 1763-64.
46. 858 P.2d 598, 606 (Cal. 1993).
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The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
noted in its study of informed consent that
further evolution of legal standards toward a firmer protection of indi-
vidual self-determination in medical decisions must be tempered by a
recognition of the law’s limits as an instrument of social control . . . .
[T]he Commission is concerned that efforts to draw the law further into
regulating the subtler aspects of relations between patients and health
care professionals may prove ineffective, burdensome and ultimately
counterproductive.47
Using liability law to mandate incentive disclosure has the advantage that
health plans and providers take liability threats very seriously and so are likely
to respond.  However, their reactions may be excessive, or may not effectively
convey the essential information.  Liability law fails to send a clear and consis-
tent message about the nature, timing, source, or extent of required disclosures.
This lack of clarity arises both from the variety of liability theories that might be
used, and from the uncertainty and inconsistency in how different theories will
be resolved, considering that the sufficiency of disclosure is not evaluated until
long after it is made, and in circumstances where jurors are likely to be influ-
enced by hindsight bias.48  These factors tend to produce confusing, inconsistent,
and excessively legalistic responses.  For instance, the longer disclosure exam-
ples discussed below written by health plan lawyers49 are at a college reading
level, and one of the more detailed examples is so complex that even a panel of
experts had difficulty following it.
Also, liability risks tend to discourage plans from explaining the justifica-
tions for and potential effects of physician incentives.  As illustrated below,50
plans tend to stick to factual descriptions of incentives rather than explaining
the potential benefits or drawbacks of incentives, for fear that these explana-
tions might be used against them when a bad treatment outcome occurs.  Some
health plan lawyers fear that warnings could appear to be admissions of respon-
sibility or that reassurances could be used to claim that the plan has assumed
heightened duties or to claim false advertising or broken promises.
Sensing the drawbacks of liability law, courts so far have been reluctant to
recognize theories of liability based on nondisclosure of HMO physician incen-
tives.  Courts are split on the fiduciary duty theory, with several specifically
declining to recognize a claim for breach of fiduciary duty distinct from a medi-
47. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP
30, 204, 252 (1982).
48. See generally Philip G. Peters, Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature
Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277 (1999) (noting the distortion of hindsight judgments by hindsight
and outcome bias); Jeffrey Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (exploring the effect of hindsight bias on the legal system).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 87-89.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 85-91.
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cal malpractice claim.51  In the class action suits, the fraud theory was rejected in
one case for failure to allege injury,52 and in another decision, the court ruled
that the fraud claims had not been pleaded with sufficient specificity.53  In mal-
practice cases, state courts have been reluctant to allow evidence of physician
incentives for fear that this marginally relevant but potentially inflammatory
information will unduly influence jurors.54
Although the issue of informed consent liability has not yet been presented
in litigation, a number of courts have rejected similar allegations that informed
consent was invalidated by a physician’s failure to disclose personal characteris-
tics such as substance abuse or lack of experience, which might lessen a proce-
dure’s chance of success or increase the odds of a harmful side effect.55  The
courts seem to be concerned that opening up informed consent law to such
wide-ranging personal inquiries would “raise an impracticable, if not impossi-
ble, impediment to the efficient rendering of professional services,”56 and would
lead to endless and unpredictable demands for “every fact which might con-
ceivably affect performance in the surgical suite.”57
The case for disclosing financial incentives would appear to be even weaker
than for the risk factors in these cases.  Studies to date show no clear evidence
of harm from commonly used financial incentives.58  In general, physicians
respond to incentives appropriately by following an ethic of impartiality.  This
does not mean that physicians are oblivious to financial influence.  Instead, phy-
51. Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 198 F.3d 552, 558 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting fiduciary
claim under ERISA); Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 506 (Ill. 2000) (rejecting fiduciary claim under
state law).
52. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 501 (3d Cir. 2000).
53. In re Managed Care Litig., No. 00-1334-MD-MORENO, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14501, at *3.
54. Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Shea v.
Esensten, 622 N.W.2d 130, 138 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Madsen v. Park Nicollet Med. Ctr., 419 N.W.2d
511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 431 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1988); McClellan v.
HMO of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. 1992).  But see Neade, 739 N.E.2d 496 at 507 (ruling that
evidence of economic motivation is admissible in a medical malpractice case).  See generally Paul R.
Sugarman & Valerie A. Yarasbus, Admissibility of Managed Care Financial Incentives in Medical
Malpractice Cases, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 735 (1999) (exploring conflict generated by market-driven
health care).
55. See, e.g., Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 782 (Ga. 2000) (holding that
failure to disclose cocaine use does not vitiate patient’s consent); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255,
1259 (Pa. 2001) (holding that no duty exists to disclose lack of experience with a particular surgical
procedure); Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 217 (Pa. Super. 1990) (finding no duty for a surgeon to
disclose his alcoholism and lack of license in state where the procedure was performed); Whiteside v.
Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that no duty exists to disclose lack of
experience with a particular surgical procedure).
56. Albany Urology Clinic, 528 S.E.2d at 782 n.19.
57. Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 214 (Pa. Super. 1990).
58. D.M. Berwick, Payment by Capitation and the Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1227
(1996); R.A. Dudley et al., The Impact of Financial Incentives on Quality of Health Care, 76 MILBANK
Q. 649 (1998); Fred J. Hellinger, The Impact of Financial Incentives on Physician Behavior in Managed
Care Plans: A Review of the Evidence, 53  MED. CARE RES. & REV. 294 (1996); Nicole Lurie et al., The
Effects of Capitation on Health and Functional Status of the Medicaid Elderly: A Randomized Trial, 120
ANNALS INTERN. MED. 506 (1994); MARTIN GAYNOR, ET AL., INCENTIVES IN HMOS, (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8522, 2001).
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sicians, on average, alter their practice styles consistently for all of their patients
rather than differentiating among patients based on the particular payment
method under each type of insurance.59
On balance, if incentive disclosures are accurate and reasonably under-
standable, even brief disclosures should suffice to counter most liability theories
based simply on the failure to disclose, such as claims of fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty.  More extensive disclosures that contain warnings and achieve
true understanding might be necessary under extensions of the most aggressive
versions of informed consent liability, or if a malpractice defendant is attempt-
ing to claim that a patient consented to a lower standard of care or waived
claims based in negligence.  These are much more potent legal effects, however,
than simply authorizing or acknowledging a particular payment method or a
potential conflict of interest, which is all that normally is at issue in a legal dis-
pute over incentive disclosure.
B. Regulatory Requirements
Disclosure of HMO physician incentives is also required by several sources
of regulatory law.  The first such requirement was imposed in 1996 on HMOs
participating in Medicare and Medicaid, as part of the extensive regulation of
physician incentives under these government programs.60  These regulations
require disclosure of incentives only if an HMO member specifically requests
this information.  Of greater impact are requirements for routine disclosure
adopted as part of the movement over the past few years to strengthen patient
rights and patient protections in managed care plans.61  Physician incentive dis-
closures are required by the “patients’ bill of rights” or similar rules enacted in
approximately twenty states, and imposed by executive order on health plans
for federal employees.62  The most universal regulation is one that limits the
extent to which health plans may include so-called “gag clauses” in their con-
tracts with physicians.  These clauses are meant to bar physicians from revealing
trade secrets or disparaging the plan, but they also could have the effect of pre-
venting physicians from telling patients essential information about their treat-
ment options or how their plan functions.  Virtually all states prohibit gag
clauses that have the latter effects.63
59. Mark A. Hall et al., Capitation Payment, Length of Visit, and Preventative Services: Evidence
From a National Sample of Outpatient Physicians,  8 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 332 (2002); Laurence
Baker, Association of Managed Care Market Share and Health Expenditures for Fee-for-Service
Medicare Patients, 281 JAMA 432, 436 (1999); Sherry Glied & Joshua Zivin, How Do Doctors Behave
When Some (But Not All) of Their Patients are in Managed Care?, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 337 (2002).
60. 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.479(h)(3), 434.70.
61. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION:
MANY QUALITY COMMISSION DISCLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT CURRENT PRACTICE,
GAO/HEHS 98-137 (1998).
62. Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, 281 JAMA 1424,
1424 (1999).
63. Krause, supra note 33, at 376-78; Sloan & Hall, supra note 16.
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In about half the states with affirmative disclosure requirements, the law
requires only very brief statements of how physicians are paid.  Examples in use
range from the Rhode Island statute,64 which requires only a bare statement of
whether the health plan “utilizes capitated arrangements with its participating
providers or contains other similar risk sharing arrangements,” to New Jersey
regulations,65 which require only a brief definition: “your provider may be paid a
set fee each month for each member whether or not the member actually
receives services (capitation),” and “these payment methods may include finan-
cial incentive agreements to pay some providers more (‘bonuses’) or less
(‘withholds’) based on many factors: member satisfaction, quality of care, and
control of costs and use of services among them.”  This information is included
in materials sent to potential members prior to their choosing a plan.  Many
states require instead, or in addition, that plans give lengthier descriptions of
physician incentives and that this information be included in the certificate of
coverage or other materials sent to members following enrollment.66
So far, these regulations have produced little or no controversy.  Compli-
ance is widespread, as noted below,67 and no enforcement actions have been
reported.68  Most of the health plans interviewed in the study described below69
said that the primary impetus to begin incentive disclosure was the requirement
under Medicare that HMOs disclose physician payment methods if this infor-
mation is requested by members.  Although members rarely make such a
request, Medicare HMOs must submit their disclosure language for regulatory
approval, so all were required to development disclosure statements.  Having
done so, many plans decided to include this disclosure routinely in their certifi-
cates of coverage sent to members.  Other plans do so in response to state
regulatory requirements, and a few respond to anticipated threats of liability.
Thus, it appears that health plans have been willing all along to disclose
basic information about financial incentives but were not willing to take the ini-
tiative in being the first to do so.  Consistent with the collective action and the
“lemons” explanations noted above,70 an external mandate was required to ini-
64. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.13-3(c)(9) (2001).
65. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, § 13.4 (2001).
66. See, e.g., MINN. STAT § 62J.72 (2001).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77.
68. This quiescence is in contrast to the nature and existence of the incentives themselves.  In
Texas, several lawsuits have been brought under a statute that prohibits financial incentives to withhold
medically necessary care.  TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.14(l) (2001).  The Texas Department of
Insurance entered into a consent order with the Harris Health Plan (an HMO run by Harris Methodist
Hospital in Dallas), calling for it to cease using certain aggressive financial incentive plans, to pay a
$100,000 fine, and to refund to physicians several million dollars of withheld payments.  Press Release,
Texas Department of Insurance, Harris HMO Drops Incentives, Agrees to Pay 3.4 Million (Aug. 19,
1998), available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/commish/nr08198.html.  Another suit, brought by the Texas
Attorney General against Aetna, also resulted in a settlement calling for a wide range of restrictions
and changes in various managed care practices and policies.  A press release and copy of the agreement
can be found at http://www.aetna.com/news/2000/pr_20000411.htm.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 74-75.
70. See supra text at note 22.
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tiate disclosure, but plans saw no compelling reason either to resist vigorously
having this requirement imposed or to resist compliance once it was imposed.
It appears that liability threats are not needed to induce incentive disclosure by
health plans.  Moreover, a regulatory approach is much better suited to giving
clear notice of what is legally required and to specifying the optimal source,
timing, and content of disclosure.
IV
DISCLOSURE IN PRACTICE
As recently as early 1998, it was reported that virtually no health plans were
disclosing physician incentives.71  This state of affairs has been changing rapidly.
As a consequence of the legal developments just described, most national
health plans now routinely disclose in general terms how they pay their physi-
cians.  Thus, discussion has quickly shifted from whether disclosure should occur
to how, when, and what should be disclosed, and by whom.  This section reports
on two sources of empirical evidence about incentive disclosures—one qualita-
tive72 and one quantitative.73  In the qualitative study, conducted primarily in
mid-1999, twenty key informants were interviewed who had extensive experi-
ence with incentive disclosure issues,74 and sixty-four examples of existing dis-
closure statements were collected from fourteen private insurers and five gov-
ernment authorities.75  In the quantitative study, the actual effects on knowledge
of incentives and on trust in physicians and health plans were rigorously
assessed using a randomized controlled experimental design76 in which the
incentive disclosures quoted in this note were given both by mail and by
phone.77  Evidence from these and other studies reveals how health plans have
71. U.S. Government Accounting Office, supra note 61, at 98; Hall, Economic Informed Consent,
supra note 27, at 517.
72. See Mark A. Hall, Kristin E. Kidd, & Elizabeth Dugan, Disclosure of Physician Incentives: Do
Practices Satisfy Purposes?, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2000, at 156.
73. See Mark A. Hall et al., How Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives Affects Trust, HEALTH
AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 197.
74. The informants consisted of eight academics or public policy analysts, five regulators, four
health plan representatives, two patient and consumer advocates, and one private lawyer.  Mark A.
Hall et al., Interviews with Twenty Key Informants and Supporting Materials (1999)(unpublished raw
data that was summarized in Hall et al., supra note 73, on file with authors) [hereinafter Unpublished
Interviews].
75. This sample represents disclosures used for Medicare enrollees and federal employees and
disclosures used by HMOs representing over one third of the private market, including four of the
nation’s five largest HMOs.  Id.
76. Specifically, we recruited 1,918 members of an HMO and randomly assigned them to disclosure
and control groups.  Knowledge of incentives and trust in the health plan, as well as in one’s primary
care physician, were assessed at baseline and two months later.  In between the two assessments, the
experimental group received both a mailing and a phone call disclosing the health plan’s capitation and
withhold-payment methods, using the language quoted infra in note 77.  In the phone call, the
disclosure was read aloud and a set of questions was administered to assess comprehension and to
reinforce learning; the disclosure was repeated when comprehension was lacking.  These extra efforts
were taken because the primary purpose was to assess the impact of learning this information rather
than to test the efficacy of actual disclosure methods in use.  See Id.
77. Half the subjects received the following disclosure, focusing on capitation payment:
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responded to legal requirements for incentive disclosure, and what impact these
disclosures are likely to have on those who receive them.
A. Types of Incentive Disclosure78
1. Source and Timing of Disclosure.  Overwhelmingly, disclosure is made
by health plans, not by physicians or other providers. Legal mandates have
focused on health plans because incentives originate from and are shaped by
them, and because the point of enrollment is the most convenient time for
making disclosures.  Additionally, both physicians and patients are uncomfort-
able with direct discussions of financial incentives or other aspects of payment,
especially during treatment.79  Physicians fear this will undermine trust, and
patients believe it would be inappropriate or potentially offensive to raise or
pursue such matters with their physicians.  Therefore, disclosure and discussion
by physicians remains extremely rare.80
Disclosure by health plans can occur either prior to enrollment, while
people are evaluating their options among health plans, or shortly following
enrollment, as part of the certificate of coverage and other legal documents they
receive from their plan.  Pre-enrollment disclosures are meant to facilitate more
informed choices among insurance options.  Although this is a worthwhile goal,
almost none of our key informants, including the regulators and patient advo-
We pay your primary care physician a fixed amount each month to take care of your medical
needs.  If your medical care costs less than this amount, your doctors can keep the remaining
money.  If your medical care costs more than this amount, your doctors may lose money.  This
may encourage your doctor to lower the costs of treatment.  Your doctor can do this by:
- keeping you healthy and treating your illness before it gets worse
- not ordering treatment your doctor thinks you do not need, or
- using less expensive treatment that your doctor thinks works just as well or better than
more expensive treatment.
We also pay your primary care physician a bonus each year based in part on how well he or
she holds down costs, provides preventive care, and satisfies patients’ expectations.
The other half received a different disclosure, focusing on a withhold pool:
We pay your primary care physician for each service you receive.  This may encourage your
doctor to perform more services.
To encourage your doctor to hold down costs and to deliver good service and quality care,
your primary care physician can also earn a bonus up to an average of 25 percent.  This bonus
is based in part on how well your doctor:
- holds down costs
- provides preventive care
- satisfies patients’ expectations
If a doctor, or other doctors in the same office, do poorly on one or more of these measures,
they can lose some or all of this bonus.
Id.
78. This section is adapted from Hall, Kidd, & Dugan, supra note 72.
79. See Wendy Levinson et al., Resolving Disagreements in the Patient-Physician Relationship:
Tools for Improving Communication in Managed Care, 282 JAMA 1477, 1477-83 (1999); Tracy E.
Miller & Carol R. Horowitz, Disclosing Doctors’ Incentives: Will Consumers Understand and Value the
Information?, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2000, at 149.
80. Stephen D. Pearson & T. Hyams, Talking about Money: How Primary Care Physicians
Respond to a Patient’s Question about Financial Incentives, 17 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 75 (2002).
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cates, thought this to be an achievable goal with respect to physician incentives.
Two prominent patient advocates in the study said that, although they once
thought it was crucial for people to understand prior to joining a plan how its
physician incentives operate, they now think this is not very feasible.  In fact,
they think that this is not information that consumers are likely to consider in
making their decisions.  Industry representatives and regulators in our study
agreed.  Despite the fact that Colorado was a leader in implementing a range of
preenrollment disclosure requirements, its regulators rescinded the physician
incentive aspect of their mandated disclosures soon after they were imple-
mented.81
When pre-enrollment disclosures occur, they are extremely limited.  As
noted above,82 they provide only a bare statement and the briefest of definitions
concerning the use of salary, fee-for-service, capitation, or risk-sharing arrange-
ments.  Several informants explained that more elaborate explanations would
overwhelm people with information at a point at which it is not highly relevant;
thus, people are unlikely to consider it.  Also, prior to enrollment, it is often not
possible to identify which physician or practice group a member will have, so it
is necessary to mention the full range of possible payment incentives that might
be used in the network rather than targeting the ones that will be used for a
member’s own physicians.83  Finally, assuming it would be possible to convey
information about financial incentives clearly and succinctly, the evidence dis-
cussed below indicates that few people would view this as relevant in actual
decisions about selecting a health plan.84
Therefore, most of the effort in incentive disclosure is focused on disclosures
made following enrollment.  Physician payment is one of many plan attributes
that are described in legal documents sent to subscribers shortly after they first
join the plan.  This provides ample opportunity to make disclosures as extensive
and detailed as anyone might desire.  The examples collected from five plans
and the Department of Health and Human Services ranged from approximately
three to eight hundred words, with an average of over five hundred.
2. Content of Disclosures.  The content of disclosures can be categorized
according to the three purposes identified at the outset of this paper.  An
unadorned description suffices to meet the “lemons” justification, which
observes the absence of information needed for the operation of efficient mar-
kets.  A description that discusses the possible effects of incentives, both
negative and beneficial, is addressed more to the agency theory justification,
which seeks to warn patients about potential conflicts of interest.  A broader-
81. Hall, Kidd, & Dugan, supra note 72, at 157-58.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
83. For instance, the Colorado regulation, subsequently repealed, required plans to state the
percentage of physicians paid by each method.  COLO. REG. 4-2-20 (1998).  Regulators there believe
this summary level of information is not meaningful for most consumers.  Hall, Kidd, & Dugan, supra
note 72, at 158.
84. See infra text accompanying note 108.
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ranging explanation is needed to advance educational goals that place incen-
tives in the context of health policy and other cost-containment mechanisms.
Various examples of each of these three types of disclosures can be found in
current use.
a. Bare notice and elaborate description of just the facts.  Purely descrip-
tive disclosures range from bare statements and simple definitions to lengthy,
elaborate descriptions.  What unifies all of these disclosures, despite their dif-
fering lengths, is that little or no mention is made of the reasons for different
financial incentives and their potential impact on physician behavior.  All that is
discussed is the structure and content of incentives.  Nevertheless, because of
the complexity of these incentives, the disclosures generate ample material for
descriptions, which might include each of the following:
(1) Base pay: fee-for-service, capitation, salary, per episode
(2) Additional incentives: bonuses, withholds, risk pools
(3) Limits on incentives: stop-loss, risk adjustment, no gag clauses, other
safeguards
(4) Level of incentives: plan vs. group vs. individual85
The most common form of base pay that raises incentive issues is capitation.
Various definitions in use all convey the basic idea of a fixed amount per
member.  Some descriptions include the scope of services covered by capitation
or emphasize that payment does not vary by the amount of care.  For example,
Physicians are paid a fixed amount of money each month to provide specific serv-
ices to the members they see.  This capitation payment may be divided into separate
amounts for the services they provide directly to their patients, services provided by
referral physicians, and for hospital and other types of services.
“Capitated” payment means the network provider’s annual reimbursement is
based on a fixed monthly amount for each member who accesses services through the
provider . . . .  If the annual capitation amount is less than the cost of providing or
arranging for a member’s health services, the provider generally bears all or some part
of the shortfall.  If the annual capitation amount is more than the provider’s costs, the
provider generally receives all or some part of the excess.86
Bonus, withhold, and risk pool incentives can be used in various combina-
tions and with different base pay arrangements.  Some disclosure statements
devote several long paragraphs to explaining these different structures and to
distinguishing among them.  None, however, gives the exact percentages or
dollar amounts at stake.  A few give a range, maximum, or typical percentage,
but our informants did not think it feasible to give greater detail because the
precise amounts change over time and, within many networks, vary considera-
bly.  Existing disclosures do not precisely define the basis for paying these
amounts but instead indicate only whether payment is based solely on cost and
utilization, or is also based on quality and satisfaction measures.  Finally, none
tells the size of the pool over which these incentives and measures are spread,
85. Hall, Kidd, & Dugan, supra note 72, at 161.
86. Id.
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and only a few indicate briefly how the payment is distributed within the pool.
Here is one of the more detailed examples:
For some network providers paid on a fee-for-service basis, . . . [the Plan] holds back
some of the fee-for-service payment amount.  The withheld amount generally will not
exceed [fifteen percent] ([five percent] for some network hospital[s]) of the fee sched-
ule amount.  These providers can earn the withheld amount based on certain factors.
These factors can include the financial circumstances of [the Plan], and other aggre-
gate and individual measures such as quality, efficient, cost-effectiveness and member
satisfaction.  These factors apply in various ways to different types of providers.  [The
Plan’s] Board of Directors may review these factors and decide what amount, if any,
of the withheld amount to pay the providers.  Based on individual measures, the per-
centage of the withheld amount paid if any, can vary among providers.87
Disclosures also mention arrangements, such as capping the maximum loss,
that limit the degree of financial risk.  One plan also notes that it is nonprofit,
but does not elaborate on the significance of this corporate form.  Another plan
describes risk adjustment factors used to avoid unfairly penalizing physicians
with sicker-than-average patients.88
One other notable innovation is a standardized disclosure required in
Maryland, which uses a familiar clinical scenario involving pregnancy care and
birth by Caesarean section to illustrate different types of incentives:
Fee-for-Service:
The amount of payment Dr. Jones receives will depend upon the number, types, and
complexity of services, and the time she spends providing services to Mrs. Smith.
Because Caesarean deliveries are more complicated than vaginal deliveries, Dr. Jones
is paid more to deliver Mrs. Smith’s baby than she would be paid for a vaginal deliv-
ery.
Salary:
During the months of providing prenatal care to Mrs. Smith, Dr. Jones’ salary is
unchanged.  Although Mrs. Smith’s baby is delivered by Caesarean section, a more
complicated procedure than a vaginal delivery, the method of payment will not have
any effect upon Dr. Jones’ salary.
Capitation:
Dr. Jones’ monthly payment does not change as a result of her providing ongoing care
to Mrs. Smith.  The capitation amount paid to Dr. Jones is the same whether or not
Mrs. Smith requires obstetric services.
Case rate:
All office visits for prenatal and postnatal care, as well as the delivery, and hospital-
related charges are covered by one fee.  Dr. Jones, the hospital, and other providers
(such as an anesthesiologist) will divide payment from the insurer or HMO for the
care provided to Mrs. Smith.89
Finally, existing disclosure statements usually address only the incentives
created by the health plan’s payment to physician groups, not by how groups
pay each physician.  When incentives are paid to groups of physicians, the pay-
87. Id.
88. “Adjustments to compensation . . . are made based upon the degree of patients’ illnesses in
each practice and are compared to other PCPs with similar practices in their areas.” Data summarized
in Hall, Kidd, & Dugan, supra note 72, on file with authors [hereinafter Unpublished Data].
89. Id.
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ment of individuals within the group might be entirely different than the pay-
ment to the group.  For instance, a capitated group might pay member physi-
cians a salary or some form of fee-for-service.90  Only a few disclosures
acknowledge this distinction.  They instruct members to speak to their physi-
cians for more information on a physician’s specific incentives.  Group- and
staff-model HMOs are in a position to disclose incentives at both levels, but
network or Independent Practice Associations (“IPA”) model HMOs are not.
HMOs usually are not in a position to disclose payment information at a physi-
cian-specific level within a group, because not only do they have no say over
how independent physician groups pay their members, but they usually are not
even entitled to know this.
The few plans that do disclose physician-level payment structures summa-
rize all the different payment arrangements used for various groups in the net-
work rather than focus on the arrangements that are specific to each member’s
physician or group.  Thus, a single disclosure statement is written for all situa-
tions, and members are told they can contact the plan for more specific informa-
tion about a particular provider.  As noted previously, members rarely do so.91
b. Warnings and fully informed consent.  Although many of the disclo-
sure statements we reviewed are quite lengthy, almost none of them met the
most extended informed consent model because there is virtually no mention of
the potential negative impact that incentive arrangements might have on physi-
cian behavior.  A few disclosures briefly state or imply that incentives might
induce physicians to reduce services,92 but only one says that some reduced
services might be beneficial, and it quickly disavows using bad incentives:
An improperly used incentive may encourage a physician to provide a patient with a
less effective treatment because it is less expensive.  [This HMO] will not improperly
use incentives to compensate physicians . . . .93
Rather than issue dire warnings, health plans more frequently paint incen-
tives in a positive light.94  They disavow any intent to discourage necessary care,
they observe that incentives reward improved health and early aggressive dis-
ease management, and they point out that incentives are often paid under a
formula that includes rewards for improving satisfaction, retaining patients, and
meeting preventative service goals.95  For example:
Plan compensation arrangements are designed to encourage the provision of the
most appropriate care for each patient and to discourage the provision of unnecessary
and potentially detrimental services.  The Plan incorporates specific “quality factors”
90. James C. Robinson, Blended Payment Methods in Physician Organizations Under Managed
Care, 282 JAMA 1258, 1258 (1999).
91. See supra text accompanying note 68.
92. For example, one disclosure states, “your physician or provider has a financial incentive to
reduce and control the costs of providing medical care.”  Unpublished Data, Hall, Kidd, & Dugan,
supra note 88.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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into the compensation process . . . . There are no plan compensation incentives or
penalties that are intended to encourage providers to withhold services or to minimize
or avoid referrals to specialists.
Appropriate financial incentives are intended to:
 reduce waste in the application of medical resources
 eliminate inefficiencies which may lead to artificial inflation of health care costs
 encourage physicians and health care providers to practice preventive medicine
and focus on improving the long-term health of patients
 direct attention to patient satisfaction
 improve the efficient delivery of quality health care services without compromis-
ing the quality and integrity of the physician-patient relationship.
Only appropriate financial incentives will be used to compensate physicians . . . .
There are no plan compensation incentives or penalties that are intended to encour-
age providers to withhold services or to minimize or avoid referrals to specialists.
Provider compensation is adjusted based on results in various areas, including:
appropriate diagnostic testing, specialty and hospital utilization; member satisfaction
survey results; thoroughness of medical chart documentation; clinical care measures
for diabetes, asthma, and other conditions; number of scheduled office hours; range of
office procedures offered; around-the-clock coverage; and participation in continuing
education programs.96
c. Educational objectives.  Only one plan was identified whose primary
approach to disclosure was educational.  Its medical director wrote a personal,
two-page letter to all members explaining how physician incentives operate
within the context of inflationary incentives and the need for cost containment,
as well as stressing the positive features of these incentives.97  One other health
plan included a brief reference to the cost-containment goals of physician incen-
tives:
One of the purposes of managed care is to manage and control the cost of health care.
Financial incentives in compensation arrangements with physicians and health care
providers are one method by which [the HMO] attempts to manage and control the
cost of health care.98
About half of the health plans interviewed said that disclosure done primarily
for legal reasons also has a partial educational objective of countering wide-
spread misunderstanding or suspicion of how financial incentives operate in
managed care.  Also, some plans would like to use disclosure to their advantage
by touting the merits of their incentives over those of competitors.
Surprisingly, most disclosures contain no reference to the larger context that
gives rise to physician incentives, as proposed by Morreim.99  Health plan repre-
sentatives said they have not done so in part because of their concern that a
more explanatory justification of incentives might not meet regulatory require-
ments.  Despite these difficulties and concerns, most participants felt that dis-
closure of incentives should be used as an opportunity to educate members
96. Id.
97. See infra Appendix B.
98. Unpublished Data, Hall, Kidd, & Dugan, supra note 88.
99. See infra Appendix B.
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about the purposes and benefits of cost controls and managed care techniques.
Plan representatives believe, however, that they need to fashion disclosures
primarily to satisfy the legal objectives of regulatory compliance and risk man-
agement.  Therefore, the dominant view is that educational objectives are in
tension with disclosures done for legal compliance.
d. The impact of incentive disclosure.  The effects of incentive disclo-
sures have been assessed both in terms of how well they convey information
and whether they have any impact on attitudes or behavior.  Studies of disclo-
sure by other types of insurers have concluded that insurance disclosures rarely
have any impact because few people bother to read them, and, when they do,
they do not find the information especially meaningful.100  This also character-
izes the informed views of the subjects in the qualitative study above.  When
asked what impact incentive disclosures have had, the four plan representatives
said they have been a “big yawn,” “useless,” and have not caused “even a
ripple” of a reaction.101  One large plan which, like others, invites members to
call if they have questions or want additional information, received only two
inquiries in the first two years.  Similarly, under the Medicare rules, regulators
and plans reported that beneficiaries who are told that they have the right to
request information about physician incentives rarely or never do so.
The difficulty in conveying understanding of incentives is demonstrated by
the limited success of the extensive efforts at disclosure that were undertaken in
the quantitative study.  A disclosure statement was produced that is much sim-
pler (although still detailed) compared to existing statements.102  Its mailing to
members was followed by a phone call in which the statement was read aloud
and repeated if subjects failed to correctly answer simple comprehension ques-
tions immediately after the first reading.103  Despite a fifty-percent increase in
knowledge of incentives,104 one month following the disclosure the majority of
100. Roger Formisano, The NAIC Model Life Insurance Solicitation Regulation: Measuring the
Consumer Impact in New Jersey, 48 J. RISK & INS. 59, 79 (1981); J.E. Russo & F. Leclerc,
Characteristics of Successful Product Information Programs, 47 J. SOC. ISSUES 73, 74 (1991); LARRY
KIRSCH, DO PRODUCT DISCLOSURES INFORM AND SAFEGUARD INSURANCE POLICYHOLDERS?
(2001).
101. Hall, Kidd, & Dugan, supra note 72, at 159-60.
102. Unpublished Data, Hall, Kidd, & Dugan, supra note 88.
103. The questions varied depending on the exact disclosure given.  The following set of questions
was used for the first disclosure quoted supra note 77.  The correct answer to each is “yes”:
1) Does [the HMO] pay your doctor a fixed amount each month, no matter how many or
few services you receive?
Does [the HMOs’] payment method:
2) reward your doctor for keeping you healthy?
3) reward your doctor for providing less care or fewer services?
4) reward your doctor for holding down costs?
104. Specifically, between the baseline (pre-disclosure) survey and the one month follow-up, twice
as many intervention subjects correctly answered at least three out of four comprehension questions
that asked about the basic structure of each payment method (fixed amount vs. fee-for-service) and
about several incentive effects (health promotion, cost savings, fewer/more services).  Unpublished
Interviews, supra note 74.
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subjects were not able to correctly recall the answers to more than half the
comprehension questions, and fourteen percent had no correct responses.
This result is consistent with a focus group study that found that some
people have great difficultly grasping the notion that different payment struc-
tures might affect physicians’ behavior.105  We should expect that more realistic
disclosure methods than those used in these artificial studies will be even less
successful in conveying basic understanding.  Communication theory and
research establish that the success of information disclosure depends on the
amount and complexity of information, the recipient’s prior familiarity with the
information, and the information’s salience.106  None of these conditions lends
itself to easy comprehension of physician incentives.
When disclosure does succeed in improving understanding of incentives,
then what impact can we expect on people’s attitudes and behaviors?  Critics of
physician incentives claim that disclosing them will undermine trust, and there-
fore that much of the push for disclosure is to discourage plans from using
incentives at all.  However, disclosing incentives appears to have limited or no
impact on patient trust of physicians and health plans, and may actually have a
positive effect.  In the controlled disclosure experiment, despite a doubling in
understanding of these incentives, the experimental group showed no decline in
trust in their health plans and only modest increase in trust in their physicians as
compared with the control group.107
Although these results from a single study shed only limited light on the
actual impact of such disclosures,108 they are consistent with findings from
another, more qualitative, study, which also indicates that most people are not
greatly troubled to learn that health plans include cost-containment incentives
in their physician compensation methods.109  Studies of factors that affect the
purchase of insurance indicate that price, coverage, structure, and composition
of the provider network, quality of care, and satisfaction with service are more
105. Tracy E. Miller & Carol R. Horowitz, Disclosing Doctor’s Incentives: Will Consumers
Understand and Value Information?, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2000, at 149.
106. See Judith Hibbard et al., Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75 MILBANK Q. 395,
396 (1997).
107. Hall et al., supra note 73.
108. This study is limited by the following factors: (1) the study was done in only a single health plan
located in a southeastern state; (2) only certain types of incentives were described, which included some
positive health-promoting and service-enhancing features that not all health plans include; (3) the
effects of disclosure were tested over only a short time; and (4) the evaluated effects were attitudinal
only and not behavioral.  However, these limitations should not seriously undermine the study’s
validity for the following reasons: (1) the study population was diverse and its relevant characteristics
were similar to national norms; (2) the incentives described were of a significant size (up to twenty-five
percent, compared to the ten to fifteen percent that is often used, and the disclosure went further in
describing the potentially negative effects than do many other disclosures in current use); (3) if there
were effects on attitudes, they would be expected to appear soon or immediately after the disclosure
rather than having a lagged effect; and (4) there is no particular reason to expect behavioral effects
(such as switching plans or physicians or obtaining second opinions) to appear in the absence of
attitudinal effects.  For additional discussion, see Hall et al., supra note 73.
109. Miller & Horowitz, supra note 105.
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important to insurance subscribers than how physicians are paid.110  While the
choice between indemnity versus managed care is high on this list, operational
nuances among managed care plans are not, except to the extent that they
impact bottom-line indicators such as price, quality, and satisfaction.
The gist of these initial studies is that patient trust is rooted more in the fun-
damental aspects of seeking care in the condition of illness, and in patients’ past
experiences with their providers, than in institutional and economic factors that
arguably affect the delivery of care.111  Factors that matter in theory, or that
matter to experts, do not necessarily affect the actual attitudes and behavior of
the vast majority of patients in practice.  For most people, the details of how
health plans pay physicians appear to fall into this category of secondary infor-
mational interest.  This does not mean, though, that disclosure is pointless.  Sur-
veys show that people are interested in learning about physician incentives.112
Even if the information does not change many people’s decisions, people still
have good reason to want to know.  And, even if the information is rarely actu-
ally read, the integrity of the relationships among patients, physicians, and
health plans requires that this information be made available for those who do
want to know it.  There is little indication, however, that learning about finan-
cial incentives will either alter many people’s decisions or change their views of
their physician or health plan.
V
CONCLUSION—A LAYERED APPROACH TO DISCLOSURE
Despite the widespread consensus that physician incentives under managed
care should be disclosed, there is little agreement on the who, what, when, and
how of disclosure, nor is there agreement on the primary purpose of disclosure.
Three forms of market failure point to three distinct, but overlapping, purposes
of disclosure, each of which points toward different forms, sources, and contents
of disclosures.  This complex matrix is summarized in the following chart.
110. See generally Susan Edgman-Levitan & P. Cleary, What Information Do Consumers Want and
Need?, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 42; J.H. Hibbard & J.J. Jewett, What Type of Quality
Information Do Consumers Want in a Health Care Report Card?, 53 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 28
(1996); Stephen Isaacs, Consumers’ Information Needs: Results of a National Survey, HEALTH AFF.,
Winter 1996, at 31; J.S. Lubalin & L.D. Harris-Kojetin, What do Consumers Want and Need to Know in
Making Health Care Choices?, 67 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 56 (1999); Miller & Horowitz, supra note
79; Shoshanna Sofaer, Informing and Protecting Consumers under Managed Competition, HEALTH
AFF., Winter 1993, at 76; Anne Tumlinson et al., Choosing A Health Plan: What Information Will
Consumers Use?, HEALTH AFF., May/June 1997, at 229.
111. Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be
Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613 (2001).
112. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ Attitudes Towards Cost Control Bonuses for Managed
Care Physicians, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 186.
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TABLE 1
Market
Failure
Disclosure
Purpose
Disclosure Content Disclosure Source and Timing
“Lemons”
phenomenon
Stimulate
competition
The bare structure of
incentives
Any
Imperfect
agency
Warn of
conflict of
interest
Detailed description
of incentives and
possible effects
-Health plans, pre-enrollment
-Physicians, prior to or during
treatment
Public goods Educate the
public
Purposes of
incentives
Health plans, after enrollment
Clearly, no one theory and method of disclosure can satisfy each of these
multiple concerns.  However, there need not be one solution to this problem.
Professor Susan Wolf insightfully observes that the debate over incentive dis-
closure has wrongly assumed that there should be a single “magic moment” of
disclosure.113  Instead, this issue calls for a systemic, multistaged approach in
which information about incentives is revealed by different sources, at different
times, and in varying levels of detail.  Professor Wolf’s suggestion is also consis-
tent with cognitive psychology and communication research, which remind us
that information is best presented in a manner that fits the decisions and con-
cerns that people face, at the time they face them, recognizing differences
among individuals and over time.114
Consistent with Professor Wolf’s proposal,115 it is possible to accomplish this
difficult task through a layering approach, one that provides different levels of
information at different times, allowing people to learn what they want in
response to their varying levels of interest, concern, and ability to absorb the
information.116  In the present context, layering of information might be accom-
plished in a number of ways.  What follows is merely one suggestion for how to
do so.
(1) Prior to enrollment, potential subscribers can be told simply whether
plans use physician incentives in any fashion to contain costs, as one
aspect of distinguishing managed care generally from traditional fee-for-
service indemnity coverage, and potential subscribers can receive addi-
tional, more detailed information if they request it.  This bare statement
might simply say that “this health plan pays physicians in a way that
rewards them for lowering the costs of treatment” or “. . . rewards them
for providing more treatment.”
113. Wolf, supra note 33, at 1680.
114. Id.
115. Id.  However, the details of this proposal differ significantly from hers.
116. See Hibbard et al., supra note 110.
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(2) Following enrollment, managed care members can be given fairly
detailed descriptions of the various physician incentive arrangements
used in the network, as part of the plan’s legal documents and explana-
tion of how it operates.  These explanations can, but need not, also dis-
cuss the purposes and potential positive and negative effects of these
incentives.  This additional explanation might help to advance an
educational purpose, but the reality is that very few people can be
expected to actually read disclosures at this stage.  This detailed level of
disclosure exists primarily as a contractual formality, to meet basic legal
requirements and to provide an opportunity to learn the facts about
incentives for those who desire this information.
(3) When a patient signs up with or identifies a specific physician, either the
plan or the physician group can inform the patient in writing of the
incentive arrangements directed to the particular group and within the
group.  Some clinics have a brochure that describes the basic organiza-
tion and structure of the clinic.  These disclosures could be expanded to
include financial and contractual arrangements with health plans and
with referral physicians, or they could go further to discuss the group’s
basic philosophy of medical practice.  Another model, one that is more
legalistic, comes from inflationary conflicts of interest under fee-for-
service.  Some states require physicians with an ownership or investment
interest in a medical facility or service to disclose that interest when
making a referral to the facility or service.117  Lawyers have devised writ-
ten disclosures for this purpose that might serve as a workable starting
point for physicians to disclose managed care incentives.
(4) At any point, a person who wants additional information should be told
whom to contact, including his personal physician, and that contact
person should be prepared to discuss candidly the general structure,
purpose, and potential effects of various physician incentives.  With
respect to medical treatment decisions, this means that it is up to each
individual how to assess the impact incentives might have on a physi-
cian’s recommendations and whether to raise these issues or to request
more information about incentives or treatment options before con-
senting to particular procedures.  If raised even indirectly, physicians
should be sensitive and receptive to these inquiries rather than defensive
or obtuse.118
(5) At each of these stages, fiduciary legal principles do not require a full
articulation of all the dimensions and possible effects of payment incen-
tives.  All that is required is a description of the basic structure of the
117. Glen A. Reed & Robert E. DeWitt, Referral Fee Prohibitions, in HEALTH CARE CORPORATE
LAW: FINANCING AND LIABILITY 7-40 (Mark A. Hall ed., 1999).
118. For excellent discussions of how physicians can talk about these issues directly with patients,
see Wendy Levinson et al., Resolving Disagreements in the Patient-Physician Relationship: Tools for
Improving Communication in Managed Care, 282 JAMA 1477, 1477 (1999); Miller & Horowitz, supra
note 105.
HALL_FMT.DOC 10/02/02  1:48 PM
234 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 4
incentive and perhaps the direction in which it potentially biases
decisions, leaving to individuals the decision of whether they wish to
seek more information and whether and to what extent to take this
information into account when making decisions and evaluating courses
of action.
This approach attempts to provide as much information as most people are
likely to want, at the point at which they need it, and it has sufficient flexibility
to allow people to learn more as their understanding and information needs
change.  It also attempts to meet the major objectives of disclosure while
avoiding the major objections.  Nevertheless, this is merely a preliminary sketch
and therefore leaves many issues of implementation unaddressed.  How well
this and other approaches actually succeed in these ambitions, and what impact
these disclosures will have, remains to be seen.
Whichever approach is taken, incentive disclosure should not be mandated
through liability rules.  Because the managed care industry has demonstrated its
willingness to disclose physician incentives, regulation, or perhaps only ethical
guidelines and voluntary industry standards, are sufficient to achieve wide-
spread compliance.  Prescriptive disclosure standards provide notice and consis-
tency, and they permit a level of nuance and flexibility that cannot be achieved
through a liability regime.  However, regulators need to be sensitive to the
complexities and variations in physician incentives and the need for experimen-
tation in disclosure methods.  Regulators should also work to overcome the
view that legal compliance is in tension with conveying useful information that
consumers and patients can expect to understand.  Only then can we hope that
incentive disclosure will be used to advance broader public understanding (even
among law professors), that everyone has a stake in pursing health care cost
containment, and that no single method of doing so is superior to all of the
others.
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APPENDIX A
The following is a letter sent to members of the Harvard Pilgrim Health Care
Plan by its medical director in 1998.  The arrangements it describes may not still
be in effect.
How We Pay Our Doctors
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care believes it is important for our members to
understand all aspects of their health care and coverage.  We believe we have
an obligation to provide information about the way we pay doctors to ensure
that our members are well-informed, and would like to answer some questions
that have recently been raised about this issue.  The following explains the prin-
ciples and methods that determine how physicians are paid at HPHC.
PRINCIPLES
At Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, we have relationship[s] with our 18,000
doctors who practice in a variety of settings, including health centers, independ-
ently-owned and organized medical groups, hospital-affiliated and individual
community practices.  All these relationships mean that our patients are cared
for by doctors who are paid in many different ways.  Although there may be
variation in the specifics of how we pay doctors, HPHC abides by some basic
and fundamental principles.  These principles are important to consider as you
think about how your doctor might be paid for the services he or she provides
to, or arranges for, you.
The ways we pay our doctors encourage and reward preventive care and the
early treatment and active management of acute and chronic illnesses.  This
means that our doctors have a financial incentive to give all of the care neces-
sary to keep patients healthy and help prevent more serious and costly illness
later on.
 The methods we use to pay our doctors are designed to help improve clini-
cal quality, access to services and patient communication while also attempt-
ing to lower overall costs of care.  We believe we owe it to our members to
keep premiums and out-of-pocket expenditures as low as possible so that
members can afford to get health care.  We also recognize the potential
harm of doing unnecessary tests or procedures, and believe in devoting time
and effort to deciding when they are truly needed.
 Our pay programs are intended to encourage collaboration and ensure that
no individual doctor has an incentive to provide more or less care than nec-
essary.  We believe that doctors can deliver services more effectively by
working with other doctors in various ways to manage the health care needs
of their patients.  Patients benefit from the reduced costs and improved
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quality of well-coordinated care.  Therefore, although groups of doctors
with whom we are affiliated have financial incentives to manage the total
care of their members, individual doctors will not directly benefit financially
if a specific test is not ordered or a referral not made for any individual
patient.
 We encourage our affiliated doctors to discuss appropriate treatment
options with their patients even in the rare instance in which a recom-
mended treatment is not part of their insurance coverage.  We have never
had, nor will we ever have, so-called “gag rules.”  This means that members
should feel confident that our doctors are free to discuss possible treatments
for a particular condition or illness, regardless of whether it is a covered
benefit.
 We believe that an important part of our relationship with doctors is to set
goals so that we can measure how well they are caring for our patients.  We,
therefore, include a component in our compensation programs that rewards
the provision of preventive care and achievement of high member satisfac-
tion.
PAYMENT METHODS . . . [Following this is a description of salary, capita-
tion, withhold pools, and stop-loss protection.]
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APPENDIX B
The following is excerpted from Haavi Morreim, To Tell the Truth: Disclosing
the Incentives and Limits of Managed Care, 3 AM. J. MANAGED CARE  35, 36-37
(1997).
Many people who choose managed care plans, or who are enrolled by their
employers, are concerned about the cost of health care.  They want to receive
all the care they need, but they don’t want to see premiums and out-of-pocket
costs rise right through the ceiling.  We share this concern, and would like to
explain to you the ways we try to keep costs down.
Health Care Costs Are Skyrocketing
In the U.S., the money we spend on health care has risen steadily for dec-
ades—much faster than the rate of inflation.  Today, about 15 cents out of every
dollar is [sic] spent on health care.  The quality of American health care is the
envy of the world, but we must keep the cost under control, or fewer and fewer
of us will be able to afford it.
It’s Your Money
If you receive health coverage as an employment benefit, it’s easy to sup-
pose that your employer, rather than yourself, pays for your health care.
Wrong.  You are paying, whether you realize it or not.  The bottom line is, your
employer pays a certain amount to keep you working.  Some of it goes into one
of your “pockets” as your wages, and some of it goes into your other pocket for
benefits.  In either pocket, it’s still your money.  The more your employer has to
spend for health care, the less is left to increase your wages or other benefits.
Besides that, you pay part of the monthly premium for your health plan. That
goes up when premiums go up.  And if you pay copayments at the time you
actually receive health care—whether to see the doctor or stay in the hospital or
buy medicines—those costs rise, too.
Fairness to You Requires Honoring the Limits for Everyone
When you buy your health plan, it’s with the understanding that you will
receive certain benefits in exchange for your premium.  In an HMO, it’s also
true that we must provide all the care that everyone in the plan needs, within a
fixed budget every year.  There’s plenty of money in that budget to cover all the
care that subscribers need.  But if a health plan doesn’t draw limits on what it
covers, either it will run out of money, or premiums will rise out of sight.
Once those limits are drawn, they have to be honored.  It would be unfair to
everyone if we let some people have more benefits than they actually bought.
For instance, if one of your fellow subscribers wanted us to pay for a face-lift, it
would be unfair to you if we said yes.  You bought the plan with the under-
standing that it has some limits, and if we play favorites and ignore those limits
for some subscribers, it violates everyone’s trust.  It’s our obligation to be care-
ful with your money, so that your health care is there when you need it.
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All Health Plans Enforce Limits; But Not All Plans Tell their Subscribers
As you can understand, insurers and HMOs must make sure that resources
are used wisely.  Virtually all of them have utilization controls, for example, to
ensure that patients receive necessary services, but not all sorts of tests and
treatments they don’t need.  And most HMOs have incentives that encourage
physicians to be prudent about what they order.  In fact, the Federal law that
regulates HMOs actually permits, even expects, them to have some incentives.
But not all health plans are willing to be honest with their subscribers.  Many
plans say nothing about them, and some actually forbid their physicians from
telling patients anything that might make them think poorly of the plan—
including information about limits on care.
At Healthplan, we believe that the more you know about your health plan,
the more you can be a full partner with us, and the better we can serve you.
You know what it is to work within a budget, because you do the same thing
every day as you care for your family within the income you earn.  We have to
do the same, and we know you understand what that means.
It’s Not Just Costs, It’s Quality
It’s easy to focus on costs, but there’s a flip side of that coin: quality.  The
more careful we are not to waste your money, the more funds are left to do
more for you.  Last year, for instance, we added several services, like extra
home health visits for some of our elderly patients and for women with
high-risk pregnancies.  Beyond that, as we carefully track which services are
provided for which patients, and pay attention to what works and what doesn’t,
we are learning more and more about what’s the best care.  Needless medical
tests and treatments don’t just waste money, they can sometimes do a lot of
damage.  And on the other side, not providing enough care can cost a lot more
money in the long run, if someone gets sicker because he or she wasn’t treated
right the first time.
So How Do We Keep the Lid on Health Care Costs?
Here at Healthplan, we arrange for your care by entering into contracts with
physician group practices.  Some of these groups have only primary care physi-
cians like family doctors and pediatricians; other groups include specialists like
cardiologists (heart doctors) and pulmonologists (lung doctors).  Because each
group is free to pay its doctors and deliver care in whatever way it wants, there
isn’t any one system that applies to all of them.  But most of them use two basic
approaches: utilization management, and incentives.
Utilization Management
In order to make sure that all the people who subscribe to Healthplan
receive the same high quality of care, we have developed guidelines that we ask
our physician groups to follow.  These guidelines help identify what sort of care
is actually needed, in which situations.  Sometimes they will say that you
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shouldn’t receive some things you might be expecting.  We don’t prescribe anti-
biotics for the common cold, for instance—they don’t do any good at all, and
they can actually do some harm. . . .  These guidelines are not hard-and-fast
rules.  People are not all alike, and even the best guidelines sometimes won’t
quite fit a particular patient’s needs.  At Healthplan, your physician has the dis-
cretion to make sure you get the care you need.  Sometimes, in the more com-
plicated situations, we also use a case manager. . . .
Incentives.
The second major way we contain costs is to encourage the cooperation of
our physicians.  After all, guidelines don’t do much good if they gather dust on a
shelf.  As we said just above, each physician group is free to pay its doctors in
whatever way it wants, so there isn’t any single incentive system that applies to
all of them.  We’ll describe the major ones here.  To find out the details for your
situation, you’ll need to talk to the people at your own medical group.
In order to understand how our physician-incentives work, you need first to
understand that economic incentives are everywhere.  They can’t be avoided.
Suppose you hire a fellow to paint your house.  If you pay him by the hour, he
has an incentive to take his time.  Or if you pay him a fixed fee to paint the
whole house, he has an incentive to hurry so he can get on to the next job.
But—and this is important!—just because he has this or that incentive doesn’t
mean he’ll do a bad job.  It only means that, that no matter how you pay some-
one for a service, there will be incentives in one direction or another.
That’s true of physicians, just like everyone else.  Before HMOs came along,
physicians were usually paid a separate fee for each service they performed.
That system tended to reward physicians for performing lots of services.
Gradually the medical profession began to deliver care that sometimes goes
beyond what patients really need.  As a result, a fair amount of “fat” has grown
up in the system, and physicians now need to figure out where they’ve been
doing too much.  Doing too much doesn’t just waste money.  It can hurt
patients.  But deciding what’s “too much” and what’s “just right” takes time and
effort.  Incentive systems can reward physicians for drawing this line care-
fully. . . . [Following this is a description of salary, capitation, and withhold
pools.]
Incentives for Patients
Most HMOs only have incentives for physicians. But here at Healthplan, we
believe that the patient is the most important member of the team.  Your
health, your health care, and your money are all at stake.  So we think it makes
sense to reward patients for thinking prudently about their care. . . .  The details
are in the special brochure that came with your membership packet.
